
# How to use GitHub Actions with security in mind




https://myoctocat.com

@robbos81 https://devopsjournal.io

# How to use GitHub Actions with security in mind

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https://myoctocat.com

# Words matter

#### **Workflows:**

**Execute one or more Actions** 

Workflows triggered by events:

- Push
- Creating an issue
- Release

Execute on a runner

#### **Actions:**

Steps in the workflows

Basis: Run a shell script

Create your own
Use an existing one from the marketplace



Repository security

Runners and security
Actions and security

Forking actions Keeping up to date

# Repository security

Access to code

**Workflow secrets** 

Your code

# Code - Who has access?

#### Access levels can be set at:

- Repository
- Organization
- Enterprise

### Code - Who has access?

#### **Permission levels**

Less

No access

Read only access

Triage: manage issues & pull requests

Write access

Maintain: No sensitive or destructive actions

Admin: full access

# Your code/repo — trace changes

Who made changes:


- Code: Git commit history

- Everything around your code is in the audit log

### Your code/repo – trace changes (org level)

#### Audit log:

- Access
- Secrets
- Access Tokens
- OAuth grants
- Enabling features
- Etc.



# Repository security


Access to code

Workflow secrets

Your code

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## Workflow secrets



# Workflow secrets

#### Encrypted client side before reaching GitHub:

- Encrypted with the public key for your org or repo (created and stored by GitHub)
- Used when using the UI
- Encrypt yourself before posting to the REST API

Secrets are not shared to forked repositories

# Who has access to your secrets?

For creating at repo level: Repository Owner access

For creating at org level: Admin access to the org

Set an access policy for the secrets:

- All repositories
- Private repositories
- Only selected repositories

# Who has access to your secrets?

#### Encrypted until used, then injected as:


- An environment variable
- Direct input

Will be redacted in logs

Don't use structured data (like json): hard to redact

# Who has access to your secrets?

- Actions can do anything with them!
- Anyone with access to the Action Logs should be considered to have access to your secrets



Run actions/checkout@v1

# Repository security

Access to code
Workflow secrets
Your code/repo

# Your code

#### Anything in your repository:

- Workflow files
- Shell scripts
- Your own code
- Dependencies:
  - Packages
  - Containers

#### **Best practices:**

- Static code analysis
  - Check your own code!

- Third party dependency scanning
  - 99% of your code, is not yours:
    - Scan for known vulnerabilities
  - Keep your dependencies up to date!

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# Workflow Runners

#### Actions execute on runners

#### Self hosted

- Cloud / On premises hosted by yourself
- OS + Tools update = YOUR responsibility
- Enables specific environment setup
- No usage limits

#### GitHub hosted

- OS + Tools update = GitHub's responsibility
- Per minute rating applies after the free minutes
- Clean execution environment with every run

```
name: .NET Core Deploy to IIS
on:
  push:
    branches:
      - "self-hosted"
jobs:
  build-and-deploy:
    runs-on: self-hosted
    steps:
    - uses: actions/checkout@v1
    - name: Setup .NET Core
      uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v1
      with:
        dotnet-version: 3.0.100
```

```
1  name: .NET Core
2
3  on: [push]
4
5  jobs:
6  build-and-deploy:
7
8  runs-on: ubuntu-latest
9
10  steps:
11  - uses: actions/checkout@v1
12  - name: Setup .NET Core
13  uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v1
14  with:
15  dotnet-version: 3.0.100
```

# Workflow Runners

#### Security

- Environment scope
  - Network
  - Shared state between runs

User: limit its access!

#### Best practice: Run the action inside of a container

```
jobs:
    my_first_job:
    steps:
        - name: My first step
        uses: docker://gcr.io/cloud-builders/gradle
```

```
iobs:
·test-box:
   runs-on: ubuntu-latest
   container:
     image: azul/zulu-openjdk-alpine:8-jre
···steps:··
    - uses: actions/checkout@v2
    - name: What OS is running
     run: uname -a
     name: What java version do we have
     run: java -version
```

## Workflow runners

Best practice: Don't use self hosted runners for public repositories

#### Example:

- Your repo
- New fork
- Adds malicious code
- Create pull request to your repo
- Workflow is executed on your self hosted runner?

# Persisting data between runs

#### Run 1:

- Download dependencies
- Build the code
- Somehow overwrite the dependency cache

#### **Run 2:**

- Use cached dependencies
- Build the code
- Malicious dependency in build artefact

Solarwind attack:

https://xpir.it/solorigate

# Workflow runners – Best practice

#### Don't share runners (and machines!) between repositories:

• Run 1 can influence Run 2

#### Risks:

- Malicious programs
- Escaping the runner sandbox
- Exposing access to the (network) environment
- Persisting unwanted or dangerous data

https://xpir.it/actions-kubernetes

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


**EKS on Fargate** 

#### Marketplace or by direct url

aws

INSTALLATION



Pulls Issues Codespaces Marketplace Explore

Search or jump to...

https://github.com/aws-actions/amazon-eks-fargate

Learn more about this a


- name: EKS on Fargate



# Actions and security



Are you running just any action from the internet?




Scary! Especially in an enterprise or on local runners

#### Manually:

- 1. Check the action repo code before use
- 2. Check its container images and dependencies before use

#### Only use actions listed in the marketplace?

There is no real verification process for it ⊗



#### Actions

An entirely new way to automate your development workflow.

45 results for "z" filtered by Actions x



#### **OWASP ZAP Baseline Scan**

By zaproxy 🕢 Scans the web ap 135 stars

with the OWASP ZAP Baseline Scan



#### **Zeebe Action**

By jwulf

A GitHub action to interact with Zeebe and Camunda Cloud 6 stars



Verified creator

GitHub has verified that this action was created by **pachyderm**.

Learn more about verified Actions.

### **Verified Creator**

#### **Verification process:**

- GitHub Profile information is present and accurate
- Two factor authentication is on for the organization
- Domain verification through a txt record

See: <a href="https://xpir.it/verified-publisher">https://xpir.it/verified-publisher</a>

#### Limiting actions altogether

#### Actions permissions

Allow all actions

Any action can be used, regardless of who authored it or whe

Disable Actions

The Actions tab is hidden and no workflows can run.

Allow local actions only

Only actions defined in a repository within rajbos can be used

Allow select actions

Only actions that match specified criteria can be used. Learn r

#### Actions permissions

Allow all actions

Any action can be used, regardless of who authored it or where it is defined.

Disable Actions

The Actions tab is hidden and no workflows can run.

Allow local actions only

Only actions defined in a repository within rajbos can be used.

Allow select actions

Only actions that match specified criteria can be used. Learn more about allowing specific actions to run.


Allow actions created by GitHub

Allow Marketplace actions by verified creators

Allow specified actions

rajbos-actions/\*,

Wildcards, tags, and SHAs are allowed. Examples: monalisa/octocat@\*, monalisa/octocat@v2, monalisa/\*



#### Pin the action version:

uses: gaurav-nelson/github-action-markdown-link-check@v1

uses: gaurav-nelson/github-action-markdown-link-chec @v1.0.1

#### **Best practice:** Pin the Action's commit SHA:

uses: gaurav-nelson/github-action-markdown-link-check@44a942b2f7ed0dc101d556f281e906fb79f1f478

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## Workflow attack vectors

Forks of public repos

Common fields

# Forks of public repos

```
on:
       - push
                                                   Safe, runs on merge commit, read only access
       - pull request
       - pull request target
 6
                                                   High risks! Runs on the target, has read +
                                                   write access and can access secrets
     jobs:
       build-and-deploy:
 9
10
         environment: PullRequestEnvironment
11
         runs-on: ubuntu-latest
12
13
14
         steps:
15
         - uses: actions/checkout@v1
```

https://xpir.it/gh-pwn-request

### Pull Requests

\${{ secrets.GITHUB\_TOKEN }}

#### Workflow permissions

Choose the default permissions granted to the GITHUB\_TOKEN when running workflows in this repository. You can specify more granular permissions in the workflow using YAML. Learn more.

- Read and write permissions
  Workflows have read and write permissions in the repository for all scopes.
- Read repository contents permission
   Workflows have read permissions in the repository for the contents scope only.

### Pull Requests

\${{ secrets.GITHUB\_TOKEN }}

```
name: Pull request labeler
on: [ pull_request_target ]
permissions:
  contents: read
  pull-requests: write
jobs:
  triage:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/labeler@v2
        with:
          repo-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
```

#### Common fields

```
github.event.issue.title
github.event.issue.body
github.event.pull_request.title
github.event.pull_request.body
github.event.comment.body
github.event.review.body
github.event.review_comment.body
github.event.pages.*.page_name
github.event.commits.*.message
github.event.head_commit.message
github.event.head_commit.author.email
github.event.head_commit.author.name
github.event.commits.*.author.email
github.event.commits.*.author.name
github.event.pull_request.head.ref
github.event.pull_request.head.label
github.event.pull_request.head.repo.default_branch
github.head_ref
```

#### Common fields

```
- name: Check title
run: |
   title="${{ github.event.issue.title }}"
   if [[ ! $title =~ ^.*:\ .*$ ]]; then
      echo "Bad issue title"
      exit 1
   fi
```

Payload: a"; echo test

#### Remediation

```
- name: print title
env:
   TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
run: echo `$TITLE'
```


https://xpir.it/actions-untrusted-input

Repository security
Runners and security
Actions and security

Forking actions
Keeping up to date

# Forking actions

Best practice: fork the action to a local organization Limit actions to only select actions from that organization



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# Forking actions

#### Pros:

- More secure
- Backup of actions that can be deleted or moved to a different org/repo

#### Cons:

- More maintenance work
  - Fork needs to be created
  - Kept up to date
- Limits the usage of new actions in your org

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#### Update action versions

- Review the ActionUse Actions + Commit SHA + Dependabot
- 2. Review the Action
  Fork the Actions repo, update your forks and use Dependabot

### Option 1: Use SHA + Dependabot


Best practice: Pin the Action's commit SHA:

uses: gaurav-nelson/github-action-markdown-link-check@44a942b2f7ed0dc101d556f281e906fb79f1f478

Add .github/dependabot.yml to the repo

```
#Dependabot will check the dependencies in this repo for updates
     version: 2
     updates:
         package-ecosystem: "github-actions
         -directory: "/"
         -schedule:
         --- # Check for updates to GitHub Actions every weekday
       ----interval: "daily"
9
10
11
     --- package-ecosystem: "nuget"
     ----directory: "/"
     ----schedule:
     ---- # Check for updates to on nuget packages every weekday
     ----interval: "daily"
```

#### Use Dependabot




#### Update action versions

Review the Action
 Use Actions + Commit SHA + Dependabot

2. Review the Action

Fork the Actions repo, update your forks and use Dependabot

### Keep your forked action up to date



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#### Keep your forked action up to date


Fork a repo and automate it!

https://github.com/rajbos/github-fork-updater

#### **Contains:**


- Scheduled workflow
- Creates an issue
- Review the changes
- Label the issue
- Pull in changes

#### Creates issues




@robbos81 **74** 

# Review before merging



- 1. Add a label
- 2. Fork gets updated
- 3. Issue gets closed



# Pros of forking

- Backup of the action
- Full control over updates
- Pull in updates with validation centrally
- Only allow actions from your actions organization

- Skip commit SHA lookup and updating in every workflow
- Skip adding Dependabot in every repository

# How to use GitHub Actions with security in mind

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
### Best practices summarized

- Treat workflow secrets very carefully: best to think of them as public
- Review actions' source code
- Pin actions to commit SHA
- Don't trust incoming Pull Requests on public repos
- Fork the action repo and limit actions to local actions only
- Have an organization setup to test with
- Keep your forked actions up to date

https://xpir.it/actions-best-practices

### Thank you!

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https://myoctocat.com

@robbos81 https://devopsjournal.io